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RENDERED IMPRACTICABLE:
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE
IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE
Aaron J. Wright*

INTRODUCTION
Impracticability is about change.^ The doctrine reconciles changed
circumstances, discharging contractual obligations when events
surrounding the contract vary dramatically from expectations.^ Ideally,
impracticability sets parameters for such circumstances, including how
drastic the change must be to justify discharge.^ Yet despite centuries
of development, the eurrent impractieability doctrine lacks a theoretical
foundation, leading to inconsistent ease holdings^ and doctrinal

* Editor in Chief, Cardozo Law Review, J.D. Candidate (June 2005); Tufts University, B.A.
I would like to thank Professor Paul Shupack for instilling in me a passion for contract law and
Professor Dan Crane for his thoughtful guidance. Moreover, I would like to thank Mike
Reisman, Rob Lefkowitz, Peter Melamed, and Benjamin Friedman for their superior editmg.
would also like to thank my mother, sister, and father for being a constant source of inspiration
and love, and importantly Alissa for her boundless love and unquestioned support, especially
during the past year.
,
^
1 Cook V. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[Cjhange is what
impossibility is about.").
. . .,.
,
AW ,
2 See infra Part 1 for an elaborate history of the impracticability doctrine, and ttie
circumstances under which the impracticability doctrine excuses contractual obligations
3 For a variety of theories discussing when discharge should be granted, see Andrew Kull,
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L J. 1
(1991)' Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial Impracticability in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 63 (1991); Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract
Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988); Victor R
Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 100
(1988); Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225
(1987); Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL
L REV. 617 (1983); John Henry Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and
Frustrating Things—The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419
(1969); E. Allan Famsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
(1968)' Harold J Herman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1963). For a detailed analysis of examining
whether discharge is ever warranted, see Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 }. LEGAL STUD. 42 (1990).
4 See generally John D. Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 OA. L. REV. 503, 600-25
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confusion.5 Today, courts rarely find circumstances satisfying the
modem requirements of impracticability.^ The rigid requirements of
foreseeability and the common law concept of impossibility limit the
impracticability doctrine's ability to provide "flexible adjustment
machinery,"^ leading scholars to lament that "the court must exercise its
equity powers and pray for the wisdom of Solomon" when dealing with
the mle.^
Legal economists have examined the impracticability doctrine
since the late 1960s.9 Applying traditional miero-economic theory,
these scholars have questioned whether the impracticability doctrine
promotes efficient exchanges by lowering transaction costs associated
with bargaining.'"
In 1977, two such approaches appeared
consecutively in the Journal of Legal Studies, reaching two contrary
results. In an influential article written by Richard Posner and Andrew
(1988) (listing an extensive table of cases that involve factually similar factual situations which
resulted in different judicial outcomes).
5 See Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and
Impossibility: Part I, 14 UCC L.J. 30, 31 (1981) (stating that "[jjudicial developments of the
doctrine [of impossibility] under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
common law is largely incoherent"). As aptly explained by James White and Robert Summers:
In spite of attempts by all of the contract scholars ... it remains impossible to predict
with accuracy how the [impracticability doctrine] will apply to a variety of relatively
common cases. Both the cases and the Code commentary are full of weasel words
such as "severe" shortage, "marked" increase, "basic" assiunptions, and "force
majeure."
1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-10 (4th ed. 1995).
6 Steven L. Schooner explains:
Until [1980]. . . challenges invoking section 2-615's protection made for an almost
unbroken succession of failures
The recovery obstacles posed by the Code prove
equally insurmountable to those encountered at common law. Judged in hindsight,
foreseeability and risk allocation appear obvious and the occurrence of a contingency
so often seems not extraordinary.
Steven L. Schooner, Impossibility of Performance in Public Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16
PUB. CONT. L.J. 229, 235 n.39 (1986) (citations omitted).
7 U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 5 (1996).

8 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE
WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1333 (rev. ed. 1962).
9 See generally Robert L. Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for
Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1393 (1969); Note, The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1251 (1975); Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
83 (1977); Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982). Each analysis acknowledges the contributions of predecessors, while
adding unique interpretations and analysis.
19 One main purpose of law and economics is to examine legal doctrine and evaluate its
economic efficiency, which is accomplished in the context of contract law by lowering the
transaction costs of bargaining. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-28
(6th ed. 2003) (asserting that an economic analysis of the law explains rules of law by examining
their relative economic efficiency, under a theory dubbed the "efficiency theory of the common
law").
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Rosenfield, the authors rejected the current rule encapsulated under
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-615, proposing in its place the
"superior risk bearer" model. Paul Joskow, in contrast, used the same
micro-economic insights to support § 2-615 and argued that the rule
strikes a balance between the rigid rule of enforcing all contracts and a
lenient excuse doctrine.
However, recent scholarship from the emerging field of behavioral
economics has altered our understanding of the way people traditionally
imderstand risk assessment and rationality. Over the past twenty-five

See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 89-92. Generally, the superior risk bearer is the
party that is the more efficient bearer of a particular risk, regardless of the party's ability to
prevent the risk fi'om materializing. Id. at 90. Details of the superior risk bearer model are found
infra Part III.
12 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 154-55, 163. Joskow discusses how a well designed
impracticability doctrine reduces transaction costs associated with contracting by reducing
litigation costs and preventing extensive negotiations. After a micro-economic analysis, Joskow
asserts that U.C.C § 2-615 is such a doctrine. Joskow's interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-615's
foreseeability test is fotmd in Part II infra.
13 The field of behavioral law and economics is quickly emerging. Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky provide a detailed overview of this field in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000), as does Cass Sunstein in BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (2000). Other prominent articles include: Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2002).
Scholars have increasingly applied behavioral economics to contract law. See, e.g., Robert
A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated
Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of
Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract's Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608
(1998); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
Behavioral economics has also been applied to criminal and tort law. See, e.g., Alon Harel
& Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected
Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276 (1999); Edward J.
McCaffery et al.. Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81
VA.L.REV. 1341 (1995).
Recently, scholars have employed behavioral economics to understand the corporate form,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and corporate law in general. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj,
Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); A. Mechele Dickerson, A
Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2003);
Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense o/Smith v. Van
Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2002).
The provocative nature of behavioral economics has also generated criticism. See, e.g.,
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998). Moreover,
behavioral economics has infiltrated non-academic forums. See Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit
of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, § 6, at 44 (discussing new research in behavioral
economics).
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years, economists have increasingly utilized research fro" P^osy
and other social sciences to argue that humans possess bounded
rationality,and rely on heuristics,which are distorted by
coenitive biases including over-optimism,the hindsight bias, and
the confirmation bias." These behavioral insights
the
that people make subjective probability assessments that differ from
objective probability of a given risk.^^
Armed with the insights of behavioral economics,
^J
examine micro-economic approaches to the impracticabi ity doctrine
proffered by Posner and Rosenfield, and Joskow, and will ar^e that
heuristics and cognitive biases undermine the foreseeability test
encapsulated in § 2-615.20 Moreover, this Note will arpe that a
eSamtive analysis similar to the one articulated under the supenor
risk bearer test provides a starting point to create a workable, consisten
Standard by limiting the effects of cognitive biases on the
impracticability doctrine.^'
14

Herbert A. Simon, ^ Behavioral Model for Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955>

Bounded rationality refers to the theory that rational ^ho'ce ^es
^ ®^
^ible
limitations of the decision maker, meaning
M. at 99states of the world or all
1955. J. Simon criticized economists

^Le'lllmoTeirmrsrhavTnU
economics,

which are pertinent to dlis Note.

predictable now than mactaality.^

Tinder Uncertainty: Heuristics and

ty '

examines the hindsight
.no—, tapuo.»

part III

D.V,.. J JIhiauitous Phenomenon in Many

hindsight bias.

information in ways that are partial to t ose e le
„
.pj^ confirmation bias along
suggests that the confirmation bias is "extensive and shong^ W. The contirma

i

r

p

^

—

i

n the iognl . , « » » „..=d upon » • » » «>= P ' o b " - '

™T,i"™Sfon».,io. on .ho —bill., „s. unto U-C.C. S Z.bld. >« "/™ » ™
21 See infra Part III.D.

»
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Part I will outline the development of the impracticability doctrine
from the common law impossibility doctrine to its codification in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Part II will discuss the impracticability
doctrine as interpreted through traditional micro-economics. Part III
will examine how pertinent aspects of behavioral economics undermine
reliance on an absolute foreseeability test. Moreover, this section will
examine how cognitive biases and heuristics affect the superior risk
bearer test, and will suggest a new, workable, direction for the
impracticability doctrine.
I.

THE IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE

Impracticability arises as a defense when "the real world has in
some way failed to correspond with the imaginary world hypothesized
by the parties to the contract."22
jhe modem impracticability
doctrine—now encapsulated in the Uniform Commercial Code^^—
developed over several centuries,^^ emerging out of an Anglo-American
common law that initially resisted its development.^^
Embedded in early English common law was the rigid principle of
pacta sunt servanda^^ which absolutely bound parties to contractual
obligations.^^ English courts generally refused to allow for excuse even
when performance beeame impossible or frustrated by an unanticipated
supervening event.^s As the court bluntly declared in Paradine v.

22 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 81 (1974).
23 Drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code updated the common law impossibility doctrine,
and securely placed it in one section, U.C.C. § 2-615. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, §
3-10, for a general discussion outlining the requirements of § 2-615 section, and common
instances when impracticability is invoked.
24 For a concise outline of the evolution of the impossibility doctrine see CORBIN, supra note
8, § 1320.
25 See William H. Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18
MICH. L. REV. 589, 591 (1920) (stating that the impossibility doctrine had difficulties "getting a
foothold in the English law. Misleading analogies, followed by reception of foreign legal
principles, followed by other misleading analogies, have combined that the doctrine of
impossibility is left alive, it is at times hard even for its friend to recognize it").
26 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (7th ed. 1999) (stating that pacta sunt servanda
means "agreements and stipulations of the parties (to a contract) must be observed ). For an
altemate definition, see United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that pacta sunt servanda means "agreements must be obeyed").
27 For more information on the history of pacta sunt servanda and its role in American
common law and continental civil law, see Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation,
34 VA. J. INT'LL. 405 (1994).
28 See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647) (finding a tenant who was forcibly
evicted from leased property by an invading German army obligated to continue paying rent. The
court reasoned that since the tenant did not condition his promise to pay on his continued peaceful
enjoyment of the land, the law would not protect him beyond his own agreement). But see John
D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of
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JaneP "when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge
upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding
any accident by inevitable necessity, because he may have provided
against it by his contract."^" Under this early view, parties entering into
a contract remained bound, even when faced with uncontrollable
circumstances, such as natural disaster and death.
Between 1860 and 1920, English courts chipped away at the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, firmly
establishing limited
exceptions.Drawing from the ancient Roman concept of obligation
de certo,^^ courts developed common law impossibility doctrine as an
exception to rigid enforcement of contracts, most notably in Hyde v.
Dean of Windsor^^ and Taylor v. Caldwell?'^ Hyde introduced the
concept of implied conditions, suggesting in dictum that a contract
discharges in the event of a promisor's death.^^ Taylor expanded such
implied conditions, excusing both parties upon the destruction of a
physical structure necessary for the contract's performance.^®
In Taylor, the court found Caldwell, the owner of a concert hall,
not liable to Taylor, an impresario who rented the hall, because just
prior to the engagement the building burnt to the ground.^' The court
reasoned that the continued existence of the hall constituted an implied
condition under the contract, stating that "in contracts in which the
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or
thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance
arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse
performance."^^ Thus, the court discharged Taylor's obligation to pay
Caldwell, and Caldwell's duty to pay damages to Taylor for nondelivery.39

After Taylor, the common law impossibility doctrine excused
nonperformance in the following situations: (1) when the contract's
Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 1579-88 (1987)
(arguing that courts misinterpret the meaning of Paradine v. Jane, and in fact the court did not
hold that the general rule of contractual discharge is no excuse).
29 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
30 Id at 897.
31 See Wladis, supra note 28, at 1593 ("Between 1860 and 1920, the English judiciary
proceeded to erode significantly the strict view of excuse . . . .").
32 The texts of the Roman law on the subject of the obligation de certo state: '"If a promise
has been made to deliver the slave Stichus on a certain day, and he dies before that day the
promisor is not bound.'" Page, supra note 25, at 598 (citing DIGEST, lib. XLV, tit. 1, 1. 33).
33 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (Q.B. 1597).
34 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
33 Hyde, 78 Eng. Rep. at 798. In Hyde, the court stated that no cause of action exists for
breach of contract where the promisor died before fulfilling his agreement, even though the
contract did not provide for the promisor's death. Id.
36 Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep at 315.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 314.
39 Id. at 39.
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subject matter—a specific person or thing—^became unavailable;'"^ (2)
when English law made performance illegal;"' and (3) when a clause m
the contract provided for excuse."^ Gradually, however, English courts
expanded the impossibility doctrine to other cases, including situations
where unknown pre-existing causes precluded the agreement's
performance."^
.
. . ,
English courts continued to stretch the impossibility doctnne m the
early twentieth century, developing the closely related frustration
doctrine."" The fmstration doctrine traces back to the coronation
cases,"^ most notably Krell v. HenryIn Krell, a lessee rented several

40 See Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1692) (stating that a promise to deliver a
particular horse was excused when, prior to delivery and without fault of the promisor, the horse
took sick and died). InHall v. Wright, 120 Eng. Rep. 688, 690 (1858), the court stated that:
[W]here a contract depends upon personal skill, and the act of God renders it
impossible, as, for instance, in the case of a painter employed to paint a picture who is
struck blind, it may be that the performance might be excused, and his death might also
have the same effect.
41 See. e.g., Brewster v. Kitchin, 91 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1110 (K.B. 1697) ("[W]here a man
covenants not to do a thing which was lawful for him to do, and an Act of Parliament comes after
and compels him to do it; there the Act repeals the covenants; and vice versa.").
42 See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647). The co^M holds this implicitly
when it states: "because he might have provided against it by his contract."
43 See Abbot of Westminster v. Gierke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1536) (holding that a promise
to sell a building was excused, because unknown to either party, the building had burned down
prior to the execution of the sales agreement).
r , x; < n
44 See Richard W. Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-613, il
Bus. LAW. 1089, 1090 (1977) ("In the century which followed, English courts stretched the
concept of the implied condition in contract impossibility cases beyond those of total destruction.
A first cousin, not in any way requiring impossibility, was bom of the doctrine.'). It is interesting
to note that some commentators believe that no American court of last resort has expressly
followed the doctrine of fmstration when making its decision. See. e.g., Nicholas K Weiskop,
Frustration of Contractual Purpose—Doctrine or Mythl, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 239,
(
)'
Arthur Anderson, Frustration of Contract—A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, (1953).
45 Coronation cases refer to contract disputes resulting from the cancellation of King Edward
VIl's coronation ceremonies. As Andrew Kull describes:
The coronation of King Edward Vll was to be celebrated by processions through the
streets of London on June 26 and 27, 1902, with a naval review and "illumination of
the fleet" to be held at Spithead (near the Isle of Wight) on June 28. Many contracts
were entered into in anticipation of these festivities. Some owners or tenants of
property commanding a good view of the parade route hired out rooms at high prices,
others built grandstands, had tickets printed and sold seats; shipowners chartered
vessels to organizers of pleasure cmises, who offered the public the opportunity to
observe the naval exercises. Many of those hiring rooms or chartering ships
subsequently contracted with caterers to supply refreshments to their paying or invited
guests. The contracts memorializing these arrangements employed a predictable
variety of payment terms: some required full payment in advance, others payment in
installments, with final payment due in some cases on the day of the great event and in
others some time before. Few of them contained any provision to govem the nghts of
the parties in the event the celebrations did not take place.
Kull, supra note 3, at 22. For a detailed case-by-case examination of the coronation cases, and
their role in shaping the common law impossibility doctrine, see R.G. McElroy & Glanville
Williams, The Coronation Cases, 4 MOD. L. REV. 241 (1941).
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apartments overlooking the eoronation route of King Edward
Due to the King's unexpected illness, the coronation was eancelled.^s
When the lessee refused to pay the agreed rent, the lessor sued.^^
Relying on Taylor, the court extended the impracticability doctrine^o by
reasoning that the purpose of the contract, given all circumstances, was
for the lessee to witness the King's coronation.^i Since the parties at the
time of formation failed to contemplate the King's illness and the illness
frustrated the contract's purpose, the court discharged the lessee's
obligation to pay.^^
As evidenced in both Taylor and Krell, the common law
impossibility doctrine required objective proof to discharge a party from
contractual performance.^^ Any objective possibility of successful
performance ruled out impossibility as an excuse. Strictly enforced, this
standard occasionally led to unmerciful results.^''
However, as
commercial trade expanded in the twentieth century, the objective
impossibility standard blurred^^ as some courts interpreted the
impossibility doctrine in light of prevailing business practices. A
relaxed alternative view of impossibility emerged, resting on the
"6
47
48
49
50

2 K.B. 740 (1903).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 746-57.
Id 311^6.
52 Id.
55 See In re Smoot, 82 U.S. 36, 46 (1872) ("As between individuals, the impossibility which
releases a man from the obligation to perform his contract, must be a real impossibility, and not a
mere inconvenience."); Fast, Inc. v. Shaner, 183 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1950) ("If an elderly
judge, for good consideration, promises to run 100 yards in 10 seconds and then fails to perform
he can hardly be held to puff out the defense that he could not possibly run that fast... there is a
difference between 'the thing cannot be done' and '1 cannot do it.'").
54 See Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). In Beebe, an individual
contractually agreed to obtain a Canadian patent for an American citizen. Id. Canadian law
forbade the issuance of patents to non citizens. The court refused to excuse performance,
reasoning that the law might someday change. Id. The court noted that "if the covenant be
within the range of possibility however absurd or improbable the ideas of the execution of it may
be, it will be upheld." Id. at 502.
55 This trend was noted by Sir Frederick Pollock in 1911. Pollock noted;
Indeed many things have become possible which were long supposed to be
impossible;... Formerly it seemed impossible that we should ever have direct
evidence of the physical constitution of the sim and fixed stars; we now have as much.
In the earlier edition of the book the case of an agreement to make a practicable flying
machine was propounded with some diffidence. Now several persons are ready, and
publicly offer to sell and warrant such machines.
FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 422 (1957). The court in Austin Co. v. United
States, 314 F.2d 518, 519 (Ct. CI. 1963), also noted this trend;
[I]n the not too distant past, while perhaps foreseeable, no organization would have
thought possible or imdertaken a contract to construct a device whereby a living human
body could be put in orbit around the earth; nevertheless, it has been accomplished.
Thus, in this case, we cannot categorically say that it was or is impossible to achieve
the goal called for in the plaintiffs contract.
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common understandings that the implied intent of any commercial
agreement is that "a thing is said to be impossible when it is not
practicable, and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an
excessive or unreasonable cost."^^ Labeled commercial impracticability,
courts used this subjective view of impossibility in cases involving
unforeseen costs increases," extreme difficulty," and illegality."
When attempting to standardize variations in American contract
law, the drafters of the U.C.C. included commercial impracticability as
§ 2-615.^'^ The drafters sought to codify "[t]he ever-shifting line, drawn

56 Devitt V. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.S. 654, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) (quoting
Moss V. Smith, 9 C.B. 94, 103 (1850)).
57 See, e.g.. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). In Mineral Parkland
Co., a contractor agreed to remove gravel from landowner's property for the construction job. Id.
at 290. After removing roughly half the needed gravel, the contractor refused to remove the
balance. Id. The rest of the gravel sat below water. W. at 291. Technology existed to extract the
gravel; however, the cost of removal utilizing this technology greatly exceeded the market price
of gravel. Id. Accordingly, the court excused performance. Id. at 191).
58 See, e.g., Northem Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974). Here, a
contractor agreed to repair a l^e dam by quarrying rock. Id. at 77. Due to ice on the lake, stone
removal became difficult. Id. at 78. Trucks repeatedly fell through the ice. Id. However, the
contractor continued, until the lake's condition led to the death of two workers. Id. at 79. The
court discharged the contractor's performance. Id. at 85.
59 See, e.g., Brauer v. Hyman, 121 A. 667 (N.J. 1923) (discharging a promisor from a contract
to purchase a liquor store, because of the federally mandated alcohol Prohibition); Directions, Inc.
V. New Prince Concrete Constr. Co., 491 A.2d 1347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (stating that
the regulation or law, foreign or domestic, may be an event the nonoccurrence of which was a
basic assumption upon which the contract was made); see also Note, The Fetish of Impossibility
in the Law of Contracts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 99 (1953) (arguing that courts grant the illegality
excuse to discourage criminal activity, and not because performance is impossible from an
objective or subjective standpoint).
60 See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1994), which states:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance: (a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in
whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of
his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with
any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it
later proves to be invalid ....
Commentators have written extensively on U.C.C § 2-615. Although not exclusive, excellent
analyses are found in the following: Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the
U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L. REV. 221 (1991); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of
Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial
Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203 (1979); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a
Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1032
(1977); Duesenberg, supra note 44; Michael A. Schmidt & Bruce A. Wollschlager, Section 2-615
"Commercial Impracticability": Making the Impracticable Practicable, 81 COM. L.J. 9 (1976);
Gerard A. Gilbride, The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOK.
L. REV. 177(1964).
Interestingly, uniform international contract law—^under the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), to which the United States is a signatory—
rejects the impracticability doctrine, only allowing an excuse in situations where a party proves
that failure to perform "was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not
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by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores,
[under] which the community's interest in having contracts enforced
according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness
of requiring performance."^^ Section 2-615 and its associated official
comments require the claiming party to prove that he: did not foresee®^
(or cause)63 the event at the time of contracting; did not assume the risk
of the future event's occurrence;^ and made reasonable attempts to
assure that the source of the good in question did not fail."
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into accoimt at the time of the conclusion of
the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences" United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the Intemational Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 79(1), S. TREATY DOC. No.
98-9(1986), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3,67.
.
61 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (1966). This is a
frequently cited case dealing with the modem impracticability doctrine under § 2-615. A ship
owner based his claim for recovery on the Suez Canal elosure and the corresponding need to
undertake a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Id. at 314. The court ruled that the risk of
the Suez Canal closure was allocated to the ship owner. Id. at 318. Therefore, the court barred
recovery. Mat319-20.
62 As U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 1 reads:
This section excuses a seller from the timely delivery of goods contracted for, where
his performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen
supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting.
Since virtually nothing is unforeseeable, in the sense that every event can be assigned a
mathematical probability, the foreseeability requirement is a "contemplation" doctrine, invoking
the question; what future events should have been negotiated in the underlying contract and what
contingencies were not? Joskow, supra note 9, at 157. Courts generally enforce those contracts
whose interfering future event should have been part of the decisionmaking process. M.
Professor Famsworth supports this position. See E. Allan Famsworth, supra note 3, at 876-71
(suggesting that courts should attempt to determine whether the future event was foreseen by the
parties). If the event was foreseeable, courts should then attempt to determine the parties' actual
expectations. Courts ascertain the parties' expectations by examining their negotiations, including
proposals conceming price, and trade usage. Id.
63 If for example, a shop owner bums downs his store, the owner cannot claim the
impracticability defense under § 2-615. This requirement derives implicitly frorn § 2-615's
language and explicitly from case law. See, e.g.. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (barring the seller's use of the impracticability defense where seller
could not fill as many orders as accepted); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal,
Inc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979) (denying the impracticability defense to a seller who failed to
respond to the buyer's request to deliver substitute goods after the ongmal goods became
unavailable).
u-i.,
64 Under this prong, U.C.C. § 2-615 departs from the ngid requirements for impracticability,
responding to the changing nature of eommercial transactions since the nineteenth century. Id.
However, the requirements for rendering performance impracticable are relatively strict. Id. As
U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 explains:

Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither
is a rise nor a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type
of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.
But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war,
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources or supply or the
like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller
fforti securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of
this section.

RENDERED IMPRACTICABLE
Some legal scholars characterize § 2-615 as confusing,which in
turn might explain the existence of inconsistent case holdings.^^ In an
attempt to minimize this confusion and provide justification for § 2-615,
legal economists examined the impracticability doctrine shortly after its
drafting.^^ Unfortunately, however, these scholars failed to reach a
uniform conclusion, with their collective analysis dividing into two
distinct camps best represented by the work of Richard Posner and
Andrew Rosenfield, and Paul Joskow. The following section will
discuss some general micro-economic principles, define foreseeability,
and examine these two approaches.
II.

A.

TRADITIONAL MICRO-ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE
IMPRACTICABILITY DOCTRINE
Micro-Economics, Contract Law, and Foreseeability

Law and economics posits that legal rules are best understood in
light of standard economic principles, most notably efficiency.
Efficiency asks the following question; to what degree does a given rule
of law maximize society's wealth?^^ According to law and economics,
contract law should aim to promote efficiency™ by minimizing the
Note that this section states that cost alone is not sufficient to render performance irnpracticable.
To be impracticable, the unforeseen event must have really "hurt." Joskow, iupra note 9, at 160.
65 Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-615 states: "There is no excuse under this section
however, unless the seller has employed all due measures to assure himself that his somce will
not fail." This comment refers to the case Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses
Co. 179 N.E. 283 (N.Y. 1932). In this case, a buyer sued a seller for failure to deliver molasses.
Id. at 384-85. The seller claimed that the contract implied delivery only if its exclusive supplier, a
refinery, produced enough molasses to meet the buyers needs. The refinery cut its produchon and
could not meet the needs of the seller. Id. The court did not discharge the seller from its
obligation to the buyer and held that the seller must make all reasonable attempts to avoid the
failure of the underlying condition. W.
,
, .
.• u r.h
66 See Sirianni, supra note 5, at 31 (stating generally that the impracticability doctrine
largely incoherent); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, §3-10 (expressing similar sentiment).
67 See Wladis, supra note 4, at 600-25. Compare Noonan Constr. Co. v. Warren Bros. Co.
632 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1980) (excusing manufacmrer's contractual performance after a grave
machine broke down at the seller's plant), with Cosden Oil & Chem Co. v. Karl O. He m
Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding seller's obligation to perform even
though defective machine prevented performance).
68 See sources cited supra note 9.
69 For a formalized explanation of efficiency, see THOMAS J. MICEU, ECONOMICS
LAW 4-7 (1997) Wealth maximization is also known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, for examp e.
nif A values the wood carving at $5 and B at $12, so that any prince between $5 and
$12 the transaction creates a total benefit of $7 (at a price of $10, for examp e,
considers himself $5 better off and B considers himself $2 better off), then it is an
efficient transaction provided that the harm (if any) done to third parties (minus any
benefit to them) does not exceed $7.
POSNER, supra note 10, at 14.
70 As Posner and Rosenfield remark:
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transaction costs^i associated with private exchange.^^ In the context of
the impracticability doctrine, the doctrine will realize true economic
efficiency when the rule minimizes the transaction costs associated with
bargaining.
As evidenced by the varying interpretations proffered by Posner
and Rosenfield, and Joskow, questions still remain as to whether the
current impracticability doctrine maximizes efficiency. To unravel this
knotty question—since both interpretations (albeit at different levels)
rely on the concept of foreseeability when attempting to determine the
efficiency of the impracticability doctrine—foreseeability should be
defined.'^3
jhis is especially true since Posner and Rosenfield, and
Joskow failed to explicitly define foreseeability when examining the
impracticability doctrine.
To resolve this confusion and to understand the impracticability
doctrine under the assumptions of law and economics, foreseeability
should be characterized in reference to transaction costs and efficiency.
This Note defines foreseeability by the following equation:
TC,<P,^M,

where E represents a given future event, T C E equals the transaction
costs associated with determining £"s risk and magnitude, PE equals the
probability of E\ occurrence, and ME equals £"s magnitude. In other
words, a given risk will be foreseeable if the transaction costs associated
with determining the risk and magnitude of a given event is less than or
equal to the product of the event's probability and
Conversely, an event will be unforeseeable if the costs of determining
the risk's probability and magnitude outweigh the event's potential
magnitude.^^

If the purpose of the law of eontracts is to effectuate the desires of the contracting
parties, then the proper criterion for evaluating the rules of contract law is surely that of
economic effieieney.... A law of contract not based on efficiency considerations
will... be largely futile.
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 89; Bruce, supra note 9, at 321 ( [T]he ovemdmg
economic function of contract law is the attainment of effieieney in exchange."); Note, supra note
9, at 1252 ("[A] contract principle is justified whenever its operation produces a more efficient
distribution of resources. To say that a legal doctrine is economically efficient is to say that the
doctrine makes society better off").
71 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 350 (7th ed. 1999) (defining transaction costs as the costs
of bargaining or acquiring information").
r
72 This is an extension of the famous Coase Theorem. See Ronald Coase, The Problem oj
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase Theorem states that regardless of the initial
assignment of rights, if transaction costs are low enough, then parties will bargain until they
exhaust all mutual gains, creating an efficient result. See MICELI, supra note 69, at 9.
73
i«/ra Part IIl.B-C.
,•
»
74 This equation is inspired, in part, by Learned Hand's equation for differentiating negligent
from non-negligent behavior, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cm
1947). Learned Hand's equation is B = P x L, where B is the burden of precaution, F is the
probability of harm caused by precaution, and L is liability. Id. Under the Hand Rule, negligence
analysis considers whether the burden of an untaken precaution outweighs the probability of
injury multiplied by the severity of likely damages. Id.-, see MICELI, supra note 69, at 20-23
(describing in more formal terms the Hand Rule and causation in general).
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damage.''^
Assuming the traditional micro-economic concept of
rationality—as will be assumed throughout the rest of the Note,
light of various behavioral critiques^^—this formula comports with the
economic goal of efficiency, because a rational party will not decrease
his wealth by expending money, time, and other associated transaction
costs in an attempt to determine an unforeseeable future event
Moreover, this formula helps explain the superior risk bearer test and
helps illustrate the effect of cognitive biases on the current
impracticability doctrine.
B.

The Superior Risk Bearer Model

Under Posner and Rosenfield's proposal,^® the superior risk bearer
is "the party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk m
question" i.e., the party that could have better prevented and/or insured
against a given risk.^^ Because contracting parties generally cannot
prevent future risks, however, the superior risk bearer test requires a
determination of the lowest cost insurer.^''

75 But see John Elofson, Note, The Dilemma of Changed Circur^tances
Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Rtsk Bearer Tests, 3° COLUM J .L. & SOC
PROBS 1 32-33 (1996) (describing an alternative formulation for foreseeability). Elofson ar^es
that foreseeability should be defined in reference to the "expenditure necessaiy to include a
Otee in te
M M 33. This resuU is j.s.iM on tho groun^ thM
the party claiming impracticability should prove that it was not worth the required negotiati g
costs to include an exculpatory clause explicitly allocating the risk. Id.
76 See generally Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus w
FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: HOW DO ECONOMISTS DO ECONOMICS. 227 23035 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996) (arguing that micro-economics reliance
on the rational actor is misplaced). But see Posner, supra note 13 (arguing that even in light of
behavioral economics, man is still rational); Mitchell, supra note 13 (positing that the rationality
assumotion should not be removed from law and economics).
•
,
77 This is an extension of the concept of man as a rational maxirmzer. Tradhional micro
economics assumes that an actor consciously or unconsciously maximizes
^j
will not take actions that decrease his self interest. See POSNER, supra note 10 at A. But see
Christine Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 15 (asserting that people exhibit bounded willpower,
noting that people take actions that conflict with and fail to maximize their long tem interests).
78 One commentator has compared Posner & Rosenfield's proposal to a phallus . singular
daunting rigid, and cocksure." See Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibdity Doctrine: A
Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (19 ).

79

See Posner & Rosenfield, JMpra note 9, at 90.

u , r u i ^ =I ,.,..IH

80 See id. at 91 One commentator on legal liability supports the notion that liability should
attach to the lowest cost insurer when a risk is not preventable by the p^ies involved. As
Maurice Finkelstein states: "In all cases of liability without fault it will be noticed upon
observations that the loss is placed on the shoulders of him who can regulate
easily insure against it." Maurice Finkelstein, The Functional View of Legal Liability, 34 INT L J.
ETHICS 243 249-50 (1924) (emphasis added). But see Elofson, supra note 75, at 8 (critiquing the
superior risk bearer test, because it is "an unreliable guide to contracting parties' intentions ).
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To determine the lowest eost insurer, risk appraisal costs and other
transaction costs associated with diversifying risk must be calculated.
Risk appraisal costs refer to the transaction costs of determining the
"probability that the risk will materialize" and "the magnitude of the
loss if [the risk] does materialize.''^^ Transaction costs associated with
diversifying risk represent the costs of pooling a given risk together
with other uneertain events.Once determined, the lowest cost insurer
uses these two values when charging the other party a risk premium for
bearing the risk in question^^ or determining the appropriate level of
self-insurance^'* or market insuranee needed.
On a contractual level, each party involved must first determine the
foreseeability of an event before it can efficiently exehange risk
premiums and/or purchase insurance. A party will view an event as
foreseeable if the party's transaction costs of determining a given risk
are less than or equal to the product of the risk's probability and
magnitude.^® If a party views an event as foreseeable, then, according
to Posner and Rosenfield, the lowest eost insurer will ask for a premium
from the other party in exchange for bearing the risk in question or will
purchase the appropriate level of insurance.^^
On the judicial level, if a future event renders a contract
impracticable, and the parties did not contractually allocate the risk due
to a lack of foreseeability, courts must apply a comparative analysis.*^

See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 91.
82 /rf. at 91-92.
83 See id at 91. Posner emphasizes that both elements must be known in order for the insurer
to know how much to ask from the other party to the contract as compensation for bearing the
risk in question. Id.
84 Id.-, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (7th ed. 1999) (defining self-insurance as "a plan
under which a business sets aside money to cover any loss").
85 See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance. Self-Insurance, and SelfProtection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972) (examining the interplay between the demand for market
insurance and self insurance); Yang-Ming Chang & Isaac Ehrlich, Insurance. Protection from
Risk, and Risk Bearing, 18 CANADIAN J. ECON. 574, 574-75 (1985) (citing study finding that
individuals generally prefer self-insurance to market insurance when given the option).
86 More formally, if TC^
87 However, even if parties are able to calculate risk appraisal costs, they may have a difficult
time finding insurance. As Pietro Trimarchi notes:
The principle of insurance ... lies basically in aggregating a number of homogenous
and uncorrelated risks, that are sufficient for the statistical regularity of events to make
the overall losses in a given timespan predictable with a reasonable degree of a
accmacy .... An important requisite for any given risk to be efficiently insurable is,
therefore, that it can be assessed in terms of statistical fmdings. This however is not
feasible in the case of such exceptional events as wars, intemational crises, national
political crises and the like, the occurrence of which is so spasmodic as to defy
statistical calculation over a reasonable timespan.
See Trimarchi, supra note 3, at 66-67. Moreover, even if insurance can be procured, the superior
risk bearer might have a negotiating advantage, giving him the ability to shift the risk to other
parties. See Bruce, supra note 9, at 318-19.
88 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 92-94 (describing the comparative analysis
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Under this approach, a court determines which party possessed the
lowest risk appraisal costs and transaction costs of diversification. Less
formally, courts assess which party is the lowest cost insurer by
considering the following questions: (1) which party had more
knowledge about the likelihood of the risk's occurrence?; (2) which
party had more knowledge about the consequences of the risk's
occurrence?; (3) which party was in the best position to diversify its
risks.^' Under Posner and Rosenfield's approach, a court does not
inquire into the ex post foreseeability of a given risk; rather, the court
focuses on which party possessed more knowledge about the future
event's occurrence and magnitude and/or was in the best position to
protect against the risk through diversification.^" In other words, a court
compares which party had the lower TCE.
To illustrate, assume two parties X and Y."' X has manufactured
apparel for twenty-five years, and Y owns and operates a chain of
nationwide retail stores, which sells X's items alongside those of other
suppliers. Suppose further that Y has lower risk appraisal costs than X
at the time of contracting, because Y is better acquainted with the
likelihood of a factory fire affecting his supply source and can better
estimate his own losses in case of a fire. After a fire (not of X's doing)
destroys X's factory and X fails to deliver any goods, Y sues X for
breach of contract, and X claims impracticability in defense. Under the
superior risk bearer test, a court would excuse X from contractual
performance for two reasons. First, Y possessed lower risk appraisal
costs at the time of contracting. Second, Y has lower transaction costs
associated with diversifying the fire's risk. Y could have purchased one
policy to cover all losses attributable to his supplier's factory fires,
while X would have had to expend substantial resources to investigate
the likelihood of a fire and purchase a more expensive insurance
policy.^2
If, as in the above example, it is possible for the court to determine
the lowest cost insurer, the court denies the impracticability defense to
applied to two hypothetical cases).
89 See Elofson, supra note 75, at 9 (characterizing the superior risk bearer test as a three
pronged analysis, revolving around the above questions).

90 Id.

91 This hypothetical is based in part on what Posner and Rosenfield dub "an easy case for
discharge," and, also a hypothetical provided in Elofson, supra note 75, at 9. Such a case would
occur when:
(1) the promisor asking to he discharged could not reasonably have prevented the event
rendering his performance imeconomical, and (2) the promisee could have insured
against the occurrence of the risk at a lower cost than the promisor because the
promisee: (a) was in a better position to estimate both (i) the probability of the event's
occurrence and (ii) the magnitude of the loss if it did occur and (b) could have selfinsured, whereas the promisor would have to buy most costly market insurance.
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 92.
92 See Elofson, supra note 75, at 9.
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the party with the lowest total transaction costs.^^ If, in contrast, it is
impossible for the court to determine the party with the lowest total
transaction costs surrounding the interfering risk,'^ the court denies the
impracticability defense to any involved party.^^ Posner and Rosenfield
justify this second result on the theory of pacta sunt servanda—courts
should enforce contracts.^^
1111

(3

• [111:

The Foreseeability Test Under U.C.C. § 2-615

Unlike Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test, the
impracticability doctrine under § 2-615 explicitly requires a
determination of foreseeability. Under § 2-615, for a court to excuse a
performance, a party must not have foreseen a future event's occurrence
at the time of contracting. As Official Comment 1 states: this section
excuses a seller. . . where his performance has become commercially
impracticable because of an unforeseen supervening circumstance not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.
Although every risk is foreseeable in the sense that every risk has a
slight mathematical probability of occurrence, the foreseeability
doctrine resembles a "contemplation doctrine,
forcing the judiciary

93 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 90-91. Posner and Rosenfield analogize this rule
to the operations of an insurance company. Just because an insurance company cannot prevent a
fire does not mean the insurance company does not have to indemnify the insured for the damage
caused by the fire. Id. at 92.
94 According to Posner and Rosenfield, a good example of when courts would be unable to
determine the superior risk bearer is the famous coronation cases, where neither party was in a
superior position to foresee the illness of the King. Id. at 110. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text for more information on the coronation cases.
95 Posner and Rosenfield premise this form of strict liability on the premise that the promisor
to the contract is generally the superior risk bearer and is usually in a better position to P''®5'ent
changed circumstances and estimate the probability of its occurrence. Posner & Rosenfie ,
supra note 9, at 110. Some commentators question Posner and Rosenfield's reliance on stnct
liability as a default rule for the superior risk bearer test. As one commentetor states:
[T]here are reasons to doubt whether strict liability would be the optimal rule. For one
thing, some versions of the impossibility defense has been accepted by western courts,
with infi-equent interruptions since at least Roman Times. While not dispositive, this
fact suggests that strict liability, despite its appealing simplicity, violates some deepseated intuition about the significance of changed circumstanees on the contracting
ElofsorZra note 75, at 28;
also Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Dair, Understanding
Impracticability, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 347 (1996) ("[T]he strict liability of contract
historically has been tempered by some sense of fairness or justice.").
96 See supra note 26-27.
97 U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (1994).
98 Id. The impracticability doctrine under the U.C.C. is a contemplation doctnne, because it
no event is unforeseeable because there is a mathematical probability of occurrence, the doctrine
will never be applied and contracting parties will be left with a de facto strict liability rule as the

Commercial
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ex post to make a determination of the future occurrences parties should
have reasonably included in their contract negotiations.^^
Joskow contends that micro-economic theory supports § 2-615.
The rigid foreseeability test of § 2-615 strikes a balance between the
policy of pacta sunt servanda and a lenient interpretation of
impracticability.^"" Strict enforcement of the impracticability doctrine
places the burden of future risks on the promisor, creating an incentive
for the parties to write detailed, complicated contracts that increase
negotiation costs.Increased negotiating costs, in turn, provide a
disincentive for parties to enter into contracts, limiting the ability of
parties to diversify risks and generate wealth. Conversely, a lenient
interpretation of the impracticability doctrine negates the important riskdiversifying function of fixed contracts by creating a disincentive to
provide for future risks.Joskow argues that the foreseeability test lies
in the middle. The doctrine creates an incentive for parties to articulate
reasonably contemplated future occurrences,'"^ which encourages
parties to carefully evaluate available information and allocate the risk
of foreseeable events in their contracts.'"'' Doing this, Joskow contends,
increases efficiency'"^ by reducing the transaction costs associated with
bargaining.'""

99 To illustrate, if parties live in the San Francisco Bay area and enter into a long term
construction contract there for twenty years, it might be unreasonable for the parties to allocate
the risk of a debilitating blizzard. However, it would be reasonable for the parties to take into
account the possibility of an earthquake or national war.
100 According to Joskow, § 2-615 sets a "strict standard that contracts will be performed unless
certain low-probability events occur." Joskow, supra note 9, at 163. Moreover, the test does not
"reward suppliers who ... do not behave efficiently." Id.
101 Rigid enforcement of contracts provides an incentive for parties to articulate every future
occurrence. This leads to over-contracting and waste. See id. at 154; Pierpaolo Battigalli &
Giovanni Maggi, Imperfect Contracting, Working Paper Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.prineeton.edu/~maggi/eontrwp3.pdf (stating that contracts are often incomplete
because it is too costly to describe all relevant contingencies and behavior of contracting parties).
192 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 153-54. A lenient interpretation of the impracticability
doctrine places the risk of future events on the promisee. Therefore, the promisee would have to
find ways to self-insure or also specify all contingencies under which the promisee expects
performance under the contract. Id.
193 Id. at 163. See supra notes 62, 64, 98 for a discussion of § 2-615's use of foreseeability as
a contemplation doctrine.
194 Joskow, supra note 9 at 163; see also Elofson, supra note 75, at 35 (stating that the
foreseeability doctrine also reduces the incentive for parties to over-contract). Since the
impossibility defense is only available if the future event could not have been reasonably
accounted for in the contraet, a promisor is eneouraged to allocate risks contractually. However,
parties are not encouraged to bargain for exhaustive exeulpatory clauses, because the
impossibility defense is available as a means of reading appropriate clauses into the contract
should extremely remote risks occur. Id. at 35-36. Therefore, the foreseeability test encourages
efficient negotiation. Id. at 36.
195 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reduction of
transaction costs as the paradigm under which law and economics views legal rules.
196 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 163 ("U.C.C. § 2-615 as now interpreted does appear to
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Interestingly, Joskow also raises, as an aside, that foreseeability
may only be understood in conjunction with bounded rationality.'"^
Bounded rationality acknowledges that people lack infinite cognitive
abilities and fail to assimilate and order infinite amounts of
information.'"^ This inability may explain why people lack the ability
to determine the probability and magnitude of every future risk.'""
Under the above definition of foreseeability, cognitive limitations make
the transaction costs of determining every risk's probability and
magnitude economically prohibitive.
The transaction costs of
determining a future event's probability and magnitude may at times
outweigh the potential damage caused by the event,"" making most
events appear subjectively unforeseeable at any given moment.
While a relatively new concept at the time Joskow penned his
article, bounded rationality now rests as a primary theory of behavioral
economics, helping to explain how people make decisions.'" The
following section outlines those precepts of behavioral economics that
are pertinent for the rest of the Note and examines their effect on
foreseeability under § 2-615 and the superior risk bearer test.
III.

IMPRACTICABILITY, FORESEEABILITY, AND BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS
A.

Behavioral Economics

Behavioral law and economics explores the implications of actual
human behavior on the law,"^ stressing the existence of an important
promote voluntary exchange by reducing transaction costs and providing guidance and
encouragement for efficient use of information about alternative future states of the world in
contract negotiations . ...").
107 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 157 ("The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if
we introduce the concept of 'bounded rationality.'").
108 See supra note 14; see also infra text accompanying notes 118-25 (discussing of bounded
rationality and its effect on subjective probability assessments).
109 See Joskow, supra note 9, at 157 (stating that "bounded rationality recognizes that human
beings cannot evaluate all possible states of the world or all available information that might
affect a particular situation").
110 Micro-economics represent the concept of cognitive limitations by defining them as
"positive information costs." Such costs are divided into two categories: the costs of acquiring
information, and the costs of absorbing or processing information. See POSNER, supra note 10, at
17.
111 See supra notes 14, 18 and in/ra notes 118-25.
112 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1476 (asserting that the purpose of
behavioral law and economics is to understand how acmal human behavior effects legal rules);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747,
1750 (1998) (stating that the purpose of behavioral law and economies is to refine traditional
micro-economic approaches to legal doctrine, by identifying "cognitive limitations" or
"information processing problems").
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bound on human decision-making; bounded rationality.''^
Thi^s
cognitive limitation helps explain how people use information to predict
Ze events, focusing on people's limited abili^ to iather and proee^
information, their use of mental shorteuts to help them do so, and their
cognitive biases in making decisions."" The presence of these fae ors
exSains why people fail to make consistent rational deeisions that
LSform to Lalth-maximizing goals.'" Moreover, these lm..tat,ons
may also bring into question traditional miero-economic assumptions of
Sdity, ulility maximization, stable preferences, and optimal
''™To™d:^"S 'r-gntaes that human cognitive faenlt^s

cannot evaluate all possible states of the world
^^
information that might affect a particular situation^"^ People are
endowed with inadequate computational skills, flawed memones,
limited amounts of time."® However, even with these constraints,
people must still make decisions by collecting and processmg
information
The manner of acquiring and processmg information is
costra^it consumes time, energy, and often money.'- Peop ^ te^
"economize to some degree on information," minimizing the ^^1 cos
of decision-making, including the cost of error.'" People adapt to

113 Although heyond the scope of this Note, two other limitations might affect hurnM decision

PSYCHOL MV 371 (1988); let alio Eoben E. Scoti, Error ««( SaimljV "
iltai tot=m.l p~,, 09.1.; limll.tion.,

.he w.y in wbich ihe process of Bdi.idrf

""iscrUnp « hcnrisEc- b«

beings are not particularly good at thinking rationally. ).
In 2rjXrt?t«jrnotTi?at H?? (-[Hluman cognitive abilities are not infinite^ We
have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memones."); Joskow, supra note 9,
(expressing similar sentiment).
In SuitltTc:;:
collect and process information )

that -m order to make decisions, people must
,2,4 p.ijj reality ... searching for and processing

:HH~=£-=S==~—
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limited memory capacity by making lists, and counteract their limited
brain power by using mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.^22 These
shortcuts inform appropriate decisions, given the information available
and the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker. 122 However,
because these decisions rest on shortcuts, they potentially lead to
inaccurate decisions about a future event's probability.'24
Heuristics refer to the mental lists and shortcuts people use to cope
with their bounded rationality.'25 Humans use heuristics during the
decision-making process to make quick and low-cost inferences, usually
in uncertain decision-making environments.'26 Because people possess
limited cognitive abilities, these heuristics "reduce the complex task of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations."'22 Humans use heuristics in lieu of using analytical
methods or deliberate calculations,'28 processing information by
drawing on their memories and experiences.'29 Generally, people do
not attempt to determine the objective probability of an event's
oceurrence.'^® Instead, people use heuristics to construct subjective
probability assessments, which include computations of previously
experienced events.'^' People mistakenly believe that easily "available"
et al., supra note 13, at 1477 (stating that people sometimes respond rationally to their own
cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs).
122 jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1477.
123 These decisions are reached on less than perfect information, typically using a "grab bag of
shortcuts" that have proved satisfactory over time in producing results. See Garvin, supra note
13, at 392; Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 142 n.327 (1998) (stating that limits on mental processing
and availability of data lead to the best decision possible).
124 If the costs of acquiring and processing information were zero, and human cognitive
abilities were perfect, then an individual would comprehensively search for information, process
perfectly all the information acquired, and then make the best possible decision. This decision
would be better than all the alternative decisions the individuals might have made. Therefore, this
decision would maximize the actor's subjective expected utility. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at
214.
125 Heuristics can be conceptualized as rules of thumb that lead people to conclusions "quickly
and cheaply." See Garvin, supra note 132, at 146; Cass R. Sunstein, The Perception of Risk, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1125 n.24 (2002) (book review) (providing this useful definition of
heuristics: "Heuristics are rules of thumb, substituting simple questions for a more difficult one").
126 See Jane Cioffi, Heuristics, Servants to Intuition, in Clinical Decision-making, 26 J.
ADVANCED NURSING 203, 205 (1997) (discussing how clinical nurses must use heuristics to
make decisions in uncertain environments).
127 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 3.
128 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205-06 (describing smdies finding that heuristics are used in
lieu of objective calculations of surrounding events).
129 See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 220 ("When an actor makes a decision that requires a
judgment about the probability of an event, he commonly judges that probability on the basis of
comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to his memory or imagination."); Cioffi,
supra note 126, at 205 (acknowledging that heuristics are made in reference to previous events,
causality, exemplars, and availability).
130 See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 221 (asserting that heuristics lead to systematic biases
because factors other than objective probability and frequency affect how people make decisions).
131 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205. Individuals process information of a subjective nature
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events—those easy to recall—will more likely occur than events more
difficult to remember.The use of availability heuristics leads to
decisional error when assessing risk, because vivid memories of recent
events are recalled with more ease than commonplace ones.'^s por
example, people tend to overestimate the possibility of contracting
specific diseases if family members or close friends suffer from them.
availability heuristics helpful when making
While people find
decisions,i35
they may lead to inaccurate subjective probability
assessments.'^^
Beyond heuristics, humans also exhibit cognitive biases that
further shape an individual's subjective probability assessment for a
given future event. Three such cognitive biases are over-optimism, the
confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias. People generally exhibit
over-optimism and overconfidence.'^^ This shapes peoples decision
making ability, causing them to systematically underestimate the
probability of future events.People in most social categories believe
to estimate probability from personal experiences in judgment situations. Id. at 206. The
estimations occur rapidly, and some psychologists believe that they give judgments based on
"odds." Such odds are made imconsciously by people when placed in a decisionmaking situation
where

the answer is not certain or there are multiple answers to a single problem. M.

132 As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler state: "[T]he frequency of some event is estimated by
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type (how 'available' such instances
are). ..." Jolls et ah, supra note 13, at 1477. For a simple example of the error involved when
relying on availability heuristics see Garvin, supra note 123, at 147. Ask yourself whether there
are more words that start with the letter "K" or have "K" in the third position. If you chose the
former, then you would be incorrect. Twice as many words have the letter "K" in the third
position rather than in the first. Most people err here, because it is easier to remember words that
begin with the letter "K" than words that have "K" in the third position. Id.
133 See. e.g., Garvin, supra note 123, at 146-47 ("[Vjivid memories may color our
recollections too garishly, distorting our perceptions and. . . our analyses .... [T]he dominant
datum overwhelms its recessive mate."); Garvin, supra note 13, at 406 (stating that people tend
to overvalue their own experience in assessing risk"); Jolls et ah, supra note 13, at 1477 ("People
tend to conclude .. . that the probability of an event... is greater if they have recently witnessed
an occurrence of that event than if they have not. ).
134 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 707 (1999) ("While underestimating dangers that are not highly publicized
(heart disease, strokes, asthma^ [people] grossly overestimate risks to which the media pay a
great deal of attention (accidents, electrocution)."); Garvin, supra note 123, at 147 (asserting that
people, especially those with personal experience with natural disasters, tend to overestimate the
risk of tornadoes and floods); Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 221 (noting that events that are
"instantiated, vivid, and concrete" will be more "salient" than scenarios which are "general,
pallid, and abstract").
135 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 3.
^
136 See id. at 20 (explaining that people do not make objective assessments of an event s
probability or frequency);

Eisenberg, si/pra note

13, at 220-21.

137 See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183
(1997) (stating that even factually informed people think that risks are less likely to materialize
for themselves than for others); Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic
Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (1998) (observing that people are over-optimistic
about their fate even when they know the magnitude of the risk to the general public).
138 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 ("People systemically underestimate the extent to
which they are at risk .. . ."); Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (noting that experimental evidence
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that adverse events will not affect them,'^^ especially in situations where
they possesses the ability to minimize the risk through their own
behavior. 140 For example, roughly ninety percent of motorists believe
they are above-average drivers.i^i Recent college graduates exhibit
over-optimism about the probability of owning their own homes,
enjoying their jobs, avoiding drinking problems, and remaining
married. 142 Most decision-makers, moreover, are susceptible to the
over-optimism bias. It applies to professionals and merchants who—
even in the face of the economy's cyclical booms and depressions143—
consistently exhibit over-optimism about expected production. 144
Interestingly, the only group found not to exhibit such over-optimism is
the clinically depressed. i43
The confirmation bias also leads to a subjective undervaluation or
overvaluation of risk, by inducing people to confirm prior decisions
regardless of whether the decisions were correct when made.i46 Once
people form an initial opinion on a given subject, they tend to disregard
new information that contradicts their initial opinion.i42 For example, if
and empirical analysis demonstrate that "people make consistent and systematic errors m nsk
assessment")
139 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183. For example, homosexual men appear to
underestimate the risk that they will get AIDS even if they possess a sufficient amount of
information about the disease in general. Id.
140 See Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (asserting that when people can control the nsk and
magnitude of an event they are particularly susceptible to over-optimism, because people tend to
over-estimate their own capabilities).
141 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers Are?,
47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (describing in detail a psychological experiment which
supported this conclusion).
142 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& See. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 (1980).
143 See generally CHARLES KINDELBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES (1978)
(discussing the rise and fall of the American economy, throughout U.S. history).
144 See Jakob Brochner Madsen, Tests of Rationality Versus an "Over Optimist" Bias, 15 J.

EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 587 (1994).

145 See Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson, Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and
Nondepressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?, 108 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 441 (1979);
Benjamin M. Dykman et al.. Effects of Ascending and Descending Patterns of Success Upon
Dysphoric and Nondysphoric Subjects' Encoding, Recall, and Predictions of Future Success, 15
COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 179 (1991).
Ironically, because lawyers as a group experience higher than average levels of depression,
lawyers may as a profession minimize the over-optimism bias. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al..
Why Lawyers are Unhappy?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33 (2001).
146 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al.. Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098 (1979) (discussing in detail the confirmation bias); Nickerson, supra note 18, at 175
(declaring that the "[cjonfirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted
notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning ).
147 This is especially true for people who use weak evidence to form an initial opinion. See
Mathew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26 (1998) (discussing and
providing examples of the confirmation bias). The confirmation bias is a long recognized
phenomenon. Francis Bacon recognized this distortion on human reasoning in 1620:
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the
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a teacher initially believes that one student is smarter than another, the
teacher will likely confirm that initial opinion when interpreting later
performance even when the student's performance is sub-par.in the
context of predicting future risks, once an individual forms an initial
opinion about a given risk, he might not revise this opinion when
subsequently presented with more accurate information.
An additional cognitive bias is the hindsight bias, which refers to
the tendency to exaggerate in hindsight what one knew in foresight.'^"
In other words, the hindsight bias is "a person's tendency to judge past
decisions in light of one's current knowledge of the outcome,"
distorting "one's ability to judge the true probability of a particular
outcome."'^^
This bias shows few individual or cultural limits
influencing people throughout the world.
xhe bias, moreover,
impacts economic expectations, suggesting that the hindsight bias may
affect businesses professionals. For example, in one study, participants
rated the probabilities of various economic developments happening
after the Euro's introduction. One year later, the participants were
received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all other things else to support
and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be
found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some
distinction sets aside and rejects .... And such is the way of all superstitions whether
in astrology, dreams, omens, divine judgments, or the like; wherein men, having a
delight in such vanities, mark the events where they are fulfilled, but when they fail,
although this happened much oftener, neglect and pass them buy.
Francis Bacon, Novum organum, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 36
(Burt E.A. ed., 1939).
Another example includes a study where imdergraduates were asked to complete a
questioimaire on capital punishment. Id. at 27. After all the students finished the questiormaire, a
sample of proponents and opponents of capital punishment were selected from the initial group.
These subjects were then given randomly selected studies (and criticisms of each study), and
asked to judge the merits of the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. The results indicated that,
on average, those who were proponents before being given the additional material believed more
in the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty after reading the material, while those who were
initially opposed to the death penalty believed even less in the deterrent efficacy. Id.
149 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 142 (2003) ("Once a person
voluntarily commits to an idea or course of action, there is a strong motivation to resist evidence
that it was ill-chosen.").
150 See Rudiger Pohl et al.. Hindsight Bias Around the World, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
270, 272 (2002) (stating that the hindsight bias is very robust, and has been demonstrated in
numerous studies over a period of more than twenty-five years).
151 Debra L. Worthington et al.. Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant
Litigation: Making the Case for Court-Appointed Experts in Complex Medical and Scientific
Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PtnB. POL'Y. & L. 154, 155 (2002). The cognitive strategy of "creeping
determinism" explains the hindsight bias. This is the tendency of people to automatically
incorporate an outcome into their understanding of pre-existing circumstemces. For example,
"when people leam of an outcome, they integrate that knowledge into the story they" construct to
explain a given event. Thus, people "rewrite" events so that the begiiming, middle, and end are
causally connected. While rewriting, people "favor facts that are consistent with the outcome
over facts that are not." Id. at 155-56.
152 Pohl, supra note 151, at 271-72.
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reminded of the Euro's introduction and told about the economic
changes that occurred over the past year. Many of the study s
participants, armed with new information about the changes over the
past year, revised their initial probability assessments to better reflect
reality. 1" Given that courts judge in hindsight, this bias may also exert
a tremendous influence on judicial decision-making, especially when a
court must determine what a party '"knew or should have known.
Together, bounded rationality, availabiUty heuristics, overoptimism, the confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias provoke
questions concerning the ability of humans to accurately assess a given
risk, thereby clouding reliance on rules that require ex post
determinations of an event's foreseeability.
Accordingly, as the
following examples will illustrate, these heuristics and cognitive biases
undermine reliance on a foreseeability standard, an insight damaging to
§2-615.
B.

The Effect of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases on Subjective
Assessments of Foreseeability

Heuristics and cognitive biases are significantly implicated ^en
an individual must determine the foreseeability of a future event. When
determining the risk and magnitude of a future event, a party will re y
on heuristics to make subjective probability assessments, which are
influenced by cognitive biases.'^s
People use such subjective
probability assessments in situations lacking immediate answers, or
where all possible answers cannot be determined. ^56 Heuristics and
cognitive biases affect a party's determination of an event's probability.

153 Erik Holzl et al., Hindsight Bias in Economic Expectations: I Knew All Along What I Want
o Hear, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 437, 440-42 (2002). This also suggests that businesses
irofessionals may also be susceptible to the hindsight bias.
. . , • . u154 Rachlinski, supra note 17, at 591. Juries have been shown to
leelieence cases See e g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES; HOW JURIES DECIDE

•2002); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME; HOW JURIES THINK AND TALK ^BOUT ACCM
7000 • Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Bustness Judgment Rule^
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994); KIM F'
Rachlinski, Ex-Post Not = Ex Ante: Determining Liability 'nHinchight
^
(1995) For example, in one study, participants were asked to judge in foresight whether
municipality should take a precaution against flooding or to judge in hindsight whether ^ decision
of
not to take the same precaution was negligent after lack of planning caused one million
dlage The two conditions produced different results. In foresight, only 24 percent of the
participants decided that the municipality should take precautions, while in hindsight 57 percem
found the decision not to take precautions negligent. See Rachlinski supra note 17 at 589 ^
However, it is important to note that none of these studies polled actual junes; rather these studies
occurred
in controlled
UCUllCU lU
C-UllllVlIVA* conditions, with authors then making inferences from their results.
155 See supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.
156 See Cioffi, supra note 126, at 205
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or P E in the above definition of foreseeability. The degree to which
heuristics and cognitive biases affect this variable will determine the
foreseeability of a future event.
Decision-makers assessing probability during contract negotiations
will rely on their previous experiences.The availability of these
experiences shapes a party's assessment of a future event's probability
and magnitude. 158 To illustrate, again assume two parties X and Y. X
has manufactured apparel for twenty-five years, and Y owns and
operates a chain of nationwide retail stores which sells these items. In
all of his years in operation, X has never heard or learned of a fire
affecting his or his competitors' factories, all of which employ similar
manufacturing equipment as X. Suppose further that X can quantify
transaction costs determining the probability and magnitude of a future
fire, TCE, the probability of the future fire, PE, and the magnitude of the
fire's damage. ME. The transaction costs of determining the probability
and magnitude of the future fire equal $10,000 and the product of the
objective probability and magnitude equals $11,000, meaning that X
should objectively foresee this event. The two parties, moreover, agree
to allocate the risk of all foreseeable events.
During contract
negotiations, X will likely make a subjective probability assessment of
the likelihood of his plant's destruction. X's lack of memories
associated with fires afflicting his and his competitors' factories will
influence this probability assessment, making it likely that X will
underestimate the fire's probability and subjectively fail to foresee an
objectively foreseeable event.
In other words, X will likely
underestimate PE, concluding that the product of the fire's probability
and magnitude are less than the transaction costs of determining the
probability and magnitude of the fire. X will, therefore, fail to allocate
the risk of the fire contractually or through the purchase of insurance.
The confirmation bias also limits people's ability to determine an
event's foreseeability'by inducing people to confirm prior decisions

157 See Paul B. Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A Practical
Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 64 (2001) (stating that the
"phenomenon of availability has significant implications for contract formation"); see also Cioffi,
supra note 126, at 205.
158 See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing assessment of risk in the investor
context, and stating that "[i]nvestors may under[-]weigh low probability, high magnitude risks if
no obvious examples of the risk have recently been brought to their attention"). Choi and
Pritchard provide a helpful real-world example:
Immediately after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the United States, the net
volume of money flowing into mutual funds actually turned negative for a period of
time, even though the holders of diversified mutual funds are unlikely to suffer any
significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular company.
Id.
159 The confirmation bias leads people to a systematic underestimation of risk, which in turn
will cause a distortion in the foreseeability equation. People attempt to reduce cognitive
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regardless of whether the decisions were correct when made.^^'' In the
context of risk appraisal, if a decision-maker forms an initial opinion
that he is shielded from a given risk, he will likely maintain this opinion
throughout negotiations even when presented with more accurate
information. This, in turn, will cause an underestimation of a given
risk.i^' Conversely, if the decision-maker forms an opinion that he is
susceptible to a given risk, this opinion will carry through negotiations,
leading to an overestimation of a given risk. For example, assume the
same situation described above involving X and Y with the following
additional fact: X believes that there is no chance of a fire destroying his
factory because of a satisfactory inspection by the local fire inspector.
In other words, X subjectively believes that the product of the risk's
probability and magnitude approaches zero. Even if X leams about a
rash of fires affecting his similarly situated competitors, his initial
opinion might not change to reflect the new information. He might, for
instance, attribute his competitor's fires to eonditions, which, in this
case, the fire inspector checked. Because X believes the probability of
fire to be close to zero, any costs associated with determining the risk
and magnitude of fire become economically unreasonable, making the
fire seem subjectively unforeseeable. Accordingly, the confirmation
bias, in this situation, will prevent X from bargaining over and
allocating an objectively foreseeable risk either contractually or through
insurance.
The over-optimism bias, which indicates that people underestimate
the probability of adverse events affecting them, also affects the
foreseeability of future events.Over-optimism is most pronounced
for difficult tasks, where the individual feels that he possesses a degree
of control over the risk.'®^ Over-optimism indicates that people will
dissonance by thinking that the risks they face are lower than they are in fact. As Cass Sunstein
states, this is a "serious problem for law and policy, and a serious problem too for those who
accept the rational actor model in the social sciences." Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772-73 (2003). For more information on cognitive dissonance, see LEON

FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
160 As generally stated in notes 156-60 supra, the confirmation bias is "the tendency to
interpret ambiguous information in ways that confirm preconceived notions." Russell B.
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vi. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV.
23,46 n.57 (2000).
161 See Marrow, supra note 157, at 65 ("If a decision maker previously developed the opinion
that a specific type of loss cannot happen to him, that opinion is likely to be carried forward and
applied to new risks without serious statistical evaluation being made of the new risk.").
162 Sgg NEIL D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232
(1989) ("Optimistic biases in personal risk perceptions are important because they may seriously
hinder efforts to promote risk-reducing behaviors."). This has serious implications for the
foreseeability test under § 2-615, because if over-confidence hinders risk-reducing behavior, then
parties might not contractually allocate future risks.
163 The reason for this is that people tend to over-estimate their own capabilities. See Arlen,
supra note 137, at 1773. For example, in a study involving a random sample of New Jersey
adults, a signifieant over-optimism bias was found for twenty-five of thirty-two hazards,
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underestimate the risk of adverse future events when making subjective
probability assessments.Again, assume X, Y, and the same basic
fact pattern described above. X's transaction costs of determining the
probability and magnitude of a future fire equal $10,000, while the
product of the objective probability and magnitude equals $11,000.
After a recent rash of fires affected bis competitors' factories, X now
believes that there is a possibility that a fire might destroy bis factory.
Even though X acknowledges that a fire could affect bis factory, the
over-optimism bias suggests that X will underestimate the objective
probability that a fire will affect him. Although the fire is objectively
foreseeable, when making a subjective probability assessment, X might
underestimate the probability of the fire's occurrence, FE- If X
determines the risk of fire to be less than it objectively is due to a
satisfactory fire inspection, be will subjectively determine that the fire is
unforeseeable. Thus, although an event in reality might be objectively
foreseeable, subjective distortions caused by the over-optimism bias
will cloud the ability of X to plan for fiature events.
As the above examples demonstrate, heuristics and cognitive
biases distort individuals' subjective probability assessments. These
distortions will systematically affect whether or not an individual
consistently deems a given risk foreseeable.Since under § 2-615
courts deny the impracticability defense to parties who incorrectly
determine an event's foreseeability,'^^ the affect of cognitive distortions
on subjective probability assessments may explain why parties fail to
contract for future risks while at the same time drawing into question
whether the impracticability doctrine should rely on a foreseeability
standard.
Behavioral insights, moreover, call into question the
purported efficiency gains of Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk
bearer test on a contractual level. If parties fail to determine the
foreseeability of a future risk, they will not efficiently exchange risk

including drug addiction, lung cancer, and food poisoning. See Weinstein, supra note 142, at
1232. In the context of current impracticability doctrine, this could lead to underestimation of
risk in which the promisor ean eontrol, sueh as maehine malfunctions, supply problems, and
destmction of manufacturing facilities.
164 See Arlen, supra note 137, at 1773 (stating that "[e]vidence suggests that people are
partieularly likely to underestimate the extent to which they themselves are at risk").
165 See Scott, supra note 114, at 335 (stating that heuristies cause systematic errors in
cognitive judgment); Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 (noting that over-eonfidenee
systematically causes an underestimation of risk); Nickerson, supra note 18, at 177 (asserting that
a great deal of evidence supports the idea that the confirmation bias is extensive).
166 See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (1994).
167 Norman Praee argues that: "[T]he element of foreseeability has ... in effect, emasculated
the statute. The effeet has been to deny relief to most parties seeking it and to leave the ease law
in a state of disorder; the only consistency in options is that the [promisor] almost always loses."
Norman R. Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REV. 457,485 (1986).
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premiums and/or purchase insurance.These behavioral insights thus
question the workability of current impracticability rules that rely on a
standard of foreseeability. 169

C.

The Effect of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases on Posner and
Rosenfield's Comparative Superior Risk Bearer Test

Although behavioral phenomena draw into question the
foreseeability standard, heuristics and cognitive biases will not distort
the comparative determination of the lowest cost insurer. Under the
superior risk bearer test, if parties do not contractually allocate a risk
and an event allegedly renders performance impracticable, a court does
not inquire into the event's foreseeability; rather the court makes a
comparative analysis.'™ Under this approach, a court determines which
party possessed the lowest risk appraisal costs and transaction costs of
diversification.Formally, the foreseeability test under § 2-615
requires the court to determine ejc post whether
<P xM
Conversely, the superior risk bearer test forces a court to make only^a
comparative ex post determination of TCE plus any additional
transaction costs associated with risk diversification.
For example, again, assume X and Y and the same general facts of
the hypothetical described above. X and Y did not contractually
provide for the risk of fire. After a fire destroys X's factory, Y sues X
for breach of contract, and X claims impracticability in defense. In this
hypothetical, since X is not Y's exclusive supplier, Y is in a better
position to diversify the risk by purchasing one insurance policy to
protect against the risk of fire for any of his suppliers' factories. As
such, assume the risk appraisal costs equal $20,000 for X and $10 000
for Y. Unlike the foreseeability test under Posner and Rosenfield's
comparative analysis, a court will only examine the risk appraisal costs

'68 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
'69 Vmous decisions also provide a basis for questioning the effectiveness of the
toreseeabihty doctrine, because most courts find that most events are foreseeable. See es NealCooper Gram Co. v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding government
excuse); United States v. Wegmatic Corp., 360 F.2d
674 (2d Cir. 1966) (ruling that engineering problems sufficiently foreseeable in construction of an
innovative computer system so as deny defense); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v Gulf Oil Com 415
RS„pp 42, (S.D. Fl.. 1975)
,h.. fUe, en.l, ™.
impracticability defense), Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N E 2d 363
(Mass. 1974) (stating that labor strike foreseeable so as to preclude the impracticability defense)Maple Fams, Inc. v. City Sch. Dist. Of City of Elmira, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19741
(denying the impracticability defense to a supplier of milk where there was a significant change in
price because the fluctuations in price were foreseeable).
™ See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
^^1 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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and other transaction costs associated with the fire. The court would
deem Y the superior risk bearer regardless of the event's foreseeability,
because Y could have insured at a lower cost at the time of contracting.
Accordingly, the court will grant X the impracticability defense and
discharge his contractual obligations.
By avoiding the concept of foreseeability, Posner and Rosenfield's
comparative analysis circumvents distortions to probability assessments
caused by cognitive biases and heuristics. Determining the lowest cost
insurer forces the court to identify which party could have insured
against the outcome at the lowest cost,'^^ and denies the impracticability
defense to the lowest cost insurer.jf
court cannot determine the
lowest cost insurer, then the court does not discharge contractual
obligations, a result supported by the principle pacta sunt servanda™
D. The Effect of the Hindsight Bias on Judicial Determinations of
Foreseeability Under U.C.C. § 2-615 and the Superior Risk Bearer Test
Cognitive biases affect more than just subjective probability
assessments. They also affect courts' ability to determine an event's
objective probability in hindsight. The hindsight bias refers to the
tendency to judge past decisions in light of one's current knowledge of
the outcome.'''^ When courts make ex post decisions about ex ante
probability assessments, they are particularly susceptible to the
hindsight bias.'^^

•72 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
'73 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
•74 However, even Posner and Rosenfield question the reliance on strict liability to back up the
superior risk bearer test. As they acknowledge, "in many individual, and perhaps some classes
of, cases economic analysis ... will fail to yield a definite answer, or even a guess as to which
party is the superior risk bearer." Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 110. However, as in tort
law, when given the choice between strict liability and no liability for unavoidable answers, strict
liability might be the sensible result, absent any empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. Id.
•75 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 155.
•76 See Rachlinski, supra note 17, at 590. Rachlinski states that there are three situations
where coints must make ex pojt judgments of ex ante decisions:
(1) judgments under objective ("should have known") standards; (2) judgments under
subjective ("did know") standards; and (3) judgments of what was foreseeable. The
hindsight bias probably influences all three of these, albeit in slightly different ways.
Courts also make many judgments in hindsight that do not require an evaluation of ex
ante decisions and are therefore not subject to the influence of the hindsight bias.
Id. The hindsight bias has implications across the whole legal system. Consider, for example, the
dilemma of a defendant who, despite taking reasonable care, has caused an accident and has been
sued. The defendant's level of care will be reviewed by a judge or jury who already knows that it
proved inadequate to avoid the plaintiffs injury. Consequently, the defendant's level of care will
seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in foresight. Id.
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Under § 2-615, a court makes an ex post determination of the
interfering event's foreseeability at the time of contracting, i" Formally,
a court evaluates ex post whether TCj, <P^xMi,. To illustrate,'
assume the same basic fact pattern described above involving X and Y.
Now, suppose that X's transaction costs of determining the probability
and magnitude of a future fire equals $12,000, while the product of the
objective probability and magnitude equals $10,000. At the time of
contracting, the risk of fire
is objectively and subjectively
unforeseeable. Therefore, X does not allocate the risk of fire
contractually. Assume further that after the close of negotiations but
before performance, a fire destroys X's factory. Y sues X for breach of
performance, and X claims impracticability in defense. At this point,
the court makes an ex post determination of the ex ante foreseeability of
the risk of fire. The hindsight bias indicates that knowledge of a fire's
occurrence will tend to cause a judge to overestimate an event's
probability at the time of contracting.'^^ The hindsight bias may cause a
judicial overestimation of Pg. Depending on the degree of
overestimation, a court might determine that the fire, though actually
unforeseeable, was foreseeable at the time of contracting. If a court
makes such a determination, the court will deny the impracticability
defense.''^
Psychologists have developed de-biasing techniques that may limit
the effects of the hindsight bias. The ideal de-biasing technique
prevents implicated parties fi"om learning in advance the actual
outcome.'^" This technique, however, would be impractical in the
context of § 2-615, because to determine whether performance should
be excused, a judge will have to know what event allegedly rendered the
contract impracticable. Other de-biasing techniques may prove useful
in the context of the impracticability doctrine, especially those that
restore an individual's consideration of alternative outcomes.'^' To

SeeU.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. I (1994).
™ See Worthington et al., supra 151 at 155; Holzl, supra note 153, at 437 ("When provided
with information about the outcome of an event or about a correct solution, people tend to adjust
their prior answers to match the 'correct' one more closely.").
SeeV.C.C. § 2-615 cmt 1.
180 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 156. For example, psychologists constructed a
hypothetical case where a plaintiff sued a railroad company for personal injuries in an attempt to
examine the effect of the hindsight bias on punitive damage awards. The study revealed that
participants who lacked knowledge of the plaintiffs injury, i.e., those who did not know the
outcome, rated the quality of the railroad company's decision higher than those who already knew
the plaintiff had been injured. Most importantly, in the context of this Note, participants judging
the defendant s actions in hindsight believed the accident was more foreseeable than those who
lacked knowledge of the outcome. Id at 157.
'8' Courts are aware of the hindsight bias, and have developed procedural mechanisms to
minimize the effect of this cognitive distortion. Courts may bifhrcate issues in a given trial, so
that jurors must decide the threshold question of liability before hearing any evidence on the
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minimize the hindsight bias under the current foreseeability test, judges
must be procedurally required to consider the possibility that an event
was unforeseeable at the time of contracting. To date, no such debiasing technique exists for the impracticability doctrine under § 2-615.
Although the hindsight bias raises a question as to the wisdom of
an ex post determination of an event's foreseeability, no evidence exists
that suggests that the hindsight bias effects ex post determinations of
comparative values. Instead, a comparative analysis, like the one
proposed by Posner and Rosenfield, might actually reduce or eliminate
the effect of the hindsight bias.^^z Since the comparative analysis
requires the determination of alternative outcomes without the need to
know the ex post probability of an event's occurrence, the comparative
analysis will minimize the effect of the hindsight bias.'^^ Indeed, it is
theoretically plausible that this cognitive distortion will affect a court s
determination of X and Y's transactions costs of determining the risk
and magnitude of a given event by the same degree. If in hindsight a
judge overestimates the value of TCE for each party by the same
degree—a plausible consequence since the judge will likely view each
value with the same set of biases—the hindsight bias in effect becomes
a constant and will not distort the judge's determination of the superior
risk bearer.
E.

Future Direction of the Impracticability Doctrine

Where does this leave us? Do cognitive distortions render the
foreseeability standard impracticable? Although more empirical
research is needed to determine the extent to which cognitive distortions
affect subjective probability assessments, the proven robustness of these
behavioral phenomena draws into question the current reliance on a
foreseeability standard.Therefore, a tentative solution would be to
construct a test resistant to heuristics and cognitive biases. While
Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might be limited by a
degree to which a plaintiff was injtired. Some commentators have suggested that this is a good
way to minimize the hindsight bias in cases involving complex scientific evidence. See David B.
Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental
Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 135, 139-40 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).
182 The complex namre of Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might also limit
the effect of the hindsight bias. See Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think:
Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 823 n.l 12 (noting that "die
more decontextualized and abstract the analysis, the less likely it is to suffer from cognitive
bias"). Note, however, that decontextualizing and abstracting analysis might come with its own
problems, such as potentially de-humanizing the decision making process.
183 See Worthington et al., supra note 151, at 156.
184 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 114, at 335 (noting the pervasiveness of some cognitive biases);
Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1183 (same); Nickerson, supra 18, at 177 (same).
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court's ability to determine the transaction costs of determining the
probability and magnitude of a future event, their analysis provides a
starting point for the construction of such a doctrine.
Instead of requiring an assessment of foreseeability, the
comparative analysis requires an ex post assessment of each party's cost
of determining the event's probability and magnitude at the time of
contracting plus any transaction costs associated with diversification. 185
This test does not require a court to determine a given event's
foreseeability at the time of contracting. It only requires a court to
determine which party could have insured against the interfering
outcome at a lower cost and denies the impracticability defense to the
lowest cost insurer. If a lowest cost insurer cannot be judicially
determined, contractual obligations are not discharged, a result
supported by pacta sunt servanda.
Although Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test might
not lead to efficient exchanges of risk premiums and/or insurance at the
contractual level, their comparative analysis at least provides a
consistent standard to judge the effect of changed circumstances on
contractual performance. A workable application of this test, which
takes into account human cognitive limitations, will in turn lead to
efficiency gains in general situations by placing liability on the lowest
cost insurer, a proposition supported by commentators since the
1920S.186

CONCLUSION
After centuries of development, the impracticability doctrine is
limited by inconsistent case holdings and doctrinal confusion. Although
micro-economists have attempted to provide clarity to the doctrine, their
analysis lacks insight into how individuals make subjective probability
assessments. While Paul Joskow noted that bounded rationality might
explain the foreseeability standard, he did not take into account the
effect that heuristics and cognitive biases have on subjective probability
assessments and ex post judicial determinations of an outcome's
probability.
Over the past twenty-five years, psychologists and

185 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 90-92.
186 Ron Harris believes that law and eeonomics should rely on historical arguments to support
propositions, because current scholars will then understand their place in developments of
historical reasoning, theories, and research methods. Considering that the school of law and
economics is relatively young and dominated by pure economists, this is a wise assertion. See
Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 659, 65960 (2003). As such, Maurice Finkelstein asserted in 1920s that in the absence of fault, liability
should attach to the lowest cost insurer. See Finkelstein, supra note 80, at 249-50.
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economists have begun to model actual human decision-making,
bringing to light the pervasiveness of availability heunstics, overoptimism, the confirmation bias, and the hindsight bias Combined,
these effects undermine § 2-615's reliance on a foreseeability standard.
At the time of contracting, availability heuristics over-optimism,
and the confirmatory bias affect subjective probability assessments,
clouding the ability of parties to determine consistently whether or not a
ie Lnt is objectively probable.
If an -ent - "bjec w y
foreseeable
but behavioral distortions render it subjectively
unforeseeable, parties will not allocate the risk of the foreseeable event
either contractually (as required under § 2-615) or through the purchase
of some to
of insurance (as required under the superior nsk bearer
The hindsight bias also suggests that on the judicial level, courts
will overestimate the objective probability of a particular outcome
thereby determining that some objectively
foreseeable. In these situations, under § 2-615, courts will deny a party
the impracticability defense even though the event was unforeseeable.
Zwever, the comparative analysis of Posner and Rosenfield s
superior risk bearer test circumvents cognitive biases and ^eumtics^
The test does not require courts to determine
foreseeability at the time of contracting and minimizes the effect of the
hindsight bias. It only requires the court to determine which
.
have inted against L Lerfering outcome at a lower -t, and^
the impracticability defense to the lowest cost
f
insurer cannot be judicially determined, then contractual obligations are

"°^'^Whil?at times Posner and Rosenfield's superior risk bearer test
might not lead to efficient exchanges of risk premiums and/or insurance
at the contractual level, their comparative analysis provides a consiste
standard to judge the effect of changed circumstances on conttactua
performance. Therefore, in light of recent
Lonomics and cognitive psychology, Posner and
^to
provides the foundation for a new impracticability defense by sk
g
the discussion from foreseeability to an examination of each party s
relative knowledge and access to risk diversification mechanisms.

